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We document that hedge funds nurture mispricing in the Chinese financial market. We 
exploit the relationship between hedge fund holdings and the degree of mispricing in case that 
hedge fund holdings of stocks are mainly for arbitrage purpose but not for hedging, and that 
with and without short-selling restrictions. Hedge funds intentionally hold overvalued stocks. 
Their trades, which generate an abnormal return to 1.78% per month, also impede the 
dissipation of stock mispricing. Further, we find trend chasing may be the reason why hedge 
funds prefer to hold overvalued stocks. This research sheds new lights on the information 
content and potential investment value of hedge funds holdings in emerging markets. 
 










There is controversy regarding whether arbitrageurs are a stabilizing force that keeps stock 
prices close to fundamental values. Many studies focus on hedge funds to study value arbitrage 
behavior (Ben-David et al. 2013), because they are less regulated, and compared with mutual funds, 
they have a better principal-agent relationship and better stock selection and market timing abilities. 
Hedge funds are expected as the representative arbitrageur to engage in trading securities based on 
their price deviation from fundamental values (Cao, Chen, et al. 2018). 
However, whether hedge funds’ trading corrects asset pricing errors is still in controversy. 
Some studies show that hedge funds have the ability to exploit and correct price inefficiency (Stulz 
2007). Subsequent research supports this view, presenting evidence that hedge funds reduce the 
degree of mispricing at both the stock (Cao, Chen, et al. 2018) and the market levels (Kokkonen 
and Suominen 2015). On the contrary, other studies find that rational speculators may also ride a 
trend and drive a bubble. Speculators may initiate or contribute to price movements based on the 
expectation that positive-feedback traders will purchase the securities later at even higher prices 
(De Long et al. 1990a; Schauten, Willemstein, and Zwinkels 2015). Arbitrageurs, knowing that the 
market is overvalued, maximize profits by riding the bubble (Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003). Due 
to capital constraints, the bubble only bursts when there is a coordinated selling effort in 
arbitrageurs. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin et al. (2011) document that hedge funds 
prefer to ride bubbles, suggesting that they sometimes nurture mispricing in financial markets.  
This paper contributes to the debate by investigating hedge fund holdings and trades in China. 
Specifically, we examine whether hedge funds hold undervalued or overvalued stocks. Further, we 
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shed light on the source of hedge funds’ performance for a better understanding of their holdings 
and trades. We also examine the effect of alleviation of market friction on hedge fund holdings and 
trades.  
The Chinese hedge fund data we used in this paper has its advantages. Market conditions in 
China make the Chinese hedge funds better candidates for representative arbitrageurs to engage in 
trading securities based on their price deviation from fundamental values than the U.S. ones studied 
in  Cao, Chen, et al. (2018), because there are limited number of derivative instruments in the 
Chinese stock market and this limits means of hedging. As an emerging market, the Chinese stock 
market is gradually perfecting hedging instruments. CFFEX CSI 300 index futures only began 
trading on the China Financial Futures Exchange (CFFEX) in April 20101 and the vast majority 
of stocks have no corresponding futures in China. Compared with developed stock markets which 
has abundant index futures and individual stocks futures, excluding index constituents has 
relatively little impact on sophisticated investors’ trading behavior in the Chinese stock market. In 
addition, the Chinese stock market lifted the short-selling ban in 2010, which allows us to compare 
hedge fund behavior before and after the alleviation of that market friction. Moreover, the existing 
contrary empirical results on hedge fund behavior may be due to the fact that hedge funds hold 
and trade stocks for both value arbitrage and hedge purposes, and they may also have to hold 
overpriced stocks due to friction in the stock market, such as short-selling restrictions (Miller 1977; 
Scheinkman and Xiong 2003; Y. Chen, Da, and Huang 2019). It is usually difficult to disentangle 
the arbitrage effects from hedge effects in empirical studies. Study of Chinese hedge funds would 
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provide new evidence on the behavior of arbitrageur and contribute to the debate of whether hedge 
funds drive stocks prices to converge on their fundamental values. 
In this paper, we focus on hedge funds in China to investigate the role of sophisticated 
investors in the security price formation process. Noting that there are no funds is explicitly named 
as “hedge funds” in China, following Huang, Yao, and Zhu (2018), the privately offered funds in 
China are defined as hedge funds in our study. 2  The privately offered funds share similar 
characteristics (e.g. establishment conditions, qualified investors, operation modes, management 
and performance fees, and etc.) with hedge funds in the U.S. market, except lack of instruments to 
adopt hedging strategies. For facility, we called the “privately offered fund” as the “hedge fund” 
in the rest part of this paper. Hedge funds have developed considerably over the past decade in 
China. According to a report by the Asset Management Association of China (AMAC), there are 
11,332 registered hedge fund managers and 16,813 registered hedge funds that invest in the stock 
market, and the asset management scale had reached 1,960.5 billion CNY (284.29 billion USD) 
by the end of March 2016. Panel A of Figure 1 shows the development of all hedge funds including 
the number of hedge funds, the total net assets under management (TNA), and the TNA of hedge 
funds that invested in the stock market. We see that hedge funds in China have grown rapidly since 
2014. The Chinese State Council issued official documents to foster hedge fund industry in May 
2014. The Asset Management Association of China (AMAC) promptly responded to the 
government demand and implemented a series of policy to register and manage hedge funds. 
Consequently, we observe a boom in hedge fund industry, and even some outstanding mutual fund 
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managers moved to the industry, such as Lu Guoqiu and Wang Xiaoming. Since 2015, the AMAC 
has reported in detail the number and assets under management (AUM) of hedge funds that only 
invest in the stock market. Panel B suggests that hedge funds have become an increasing proportion 
of the Chinese stock market since 2015. 
We obtain hedge fund data from the AMAC. All hedge funds in China must be registered in 
the AMAC. Our final sample of hedge funds includes 10,096 funds and spans January 2007 
through March 2016, covering all major hedge funds trading in Chinese stock market. We match 
hedge funds with the top 10 outstanding shareholders reported by listed companies each quarter. 
It is worth noting that the Chinese government allowed the trading of futures contracts in the CSI 
300 Index beginning in 2010. Thus, we delete CSI 300 membership stocks from the sample to 
ensure that our sample includes only stocks without hedging instruments. Last, we assemble a 
database of quarterly shareholdings of hedge funds in the Chinese stock market. Our empirical 
analysis produces three sets of main findings. 
First, we explore the relationship between hedge fund holdings and stock mispricing measured 
by relative and absolute valuation models. We find strong evidence that hedge funds tend to hold 
overvalued stocks with lower idiosyncratic volatility (Hou and Loh 2016). We also propose a 
simple return-based fund-position estimation to visualize a fund’s entire position, especially funds 
that are not included in the top 10 outstanding shareholders data. The result of the return-based 
fund-position estimation suggests that hedge funds tend to hold overvalued stocks at the fund level. 
We suggest that hedge fund holdings nurture mispricing in the emerging financial market. 
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Moreover, we find that hedge fund holdings and trades impede stocks convergence on the security 
market line in the following quarter. 
Next, we investigate whether hedge funds profit from holding overvalued stocks. We 
separately track price movements for stocks with previous high versus low hedge fund holdings. 
The results show that stocks with high hedge fund holdings generate an abnormal return to 1.78% 
per month, resulting in a return spread of approximately 4.8% per year compared with low hedge 
fund holdings. We also document that hedge fund performance comes mainly from the momentum 
factor. This implies that the key reason why hedge funds prefer to hold overvalued stocks is their 
trend-chasing behavior. 
Third, we investigate changes in hedge fund holdings around market bubbles and short-selling 
ban lifts, respectively. We find that hedge funds reduce their holdings before prices collapse, but 
there are no significant changes before or after a short-selling ban lift. This suggests that hedge 
funds deliberately hold overvalued stocks. Their riding on bubble behavior is not caused by market 
friction, which is consistent with Griffin et al. (2011) and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004).  
Our paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the debate on 
whether hedge funds drive stocks prices to converge on their fundamental values. By using unique 
Chinese hedge funds data, where the hedge fund holdings are mainly come from arbitrage but not 
hedge, our research provides better understanding for the behavior of arbitrageurs and new 
evidence on the role of hedge funds in the security price formation process. Further, the short-
selling ban lift in China also allows us to study the behavior of hedge funds before and after market 
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friction has been alleviated, which is different from Huang, Yao, and Zhu (2018) who focus on 
hedge fund performance and growth under short-selling restrictions in China. Our results support 
the view that hedge fund trading nurtures mispricing in China. Second, our study reveals the role 
of arbitrageurs in asset pricing, and the information content and potential investment value of 
hedge funds holdings in emerging markets. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related literature 
and develop testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data collection and provides the summary 
statistics of the sample. It also introduces measures of stock mispricing. Section 4 reports the main 
empirical results. The final section presents our conclusions. 
2. Related Literatures and Hypotheses Development 
 Regarding the debate on the role of hedge funds in asset pricing, we first study the 
relationship between hedge fund holdings and stock mispricing. 
 The conventional wisdom is that arbitrageurs trade against mispricing and bring stock prices 
back to fundamentals. Friedman (1953) argues that when irrational and sophisticated investors 
coexist in securities markets, sophisticated investors will trade against irrational investors and 
quickly eliminate mispricing. Representing sophisticated investors, hedge funds look for mispriced 
securities, and their trading can bring prices closer to fundamental values (Akbas et al. 2015; Stulz 
2007), improve stocks’ price efficiency (Cao, Liang, et al. 2018), and reduce market-level 
misvaluation (Kokkonen and Suominen, 2015). 
However, other research challenges this view and finds that sophisticated investors nurture 
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mispricing in financial markets. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) present a model and document 
that it can be optimal for rational investors to invest in overpriced securities if they believe that 
other rational investors will not yet trade against the bubble. Empirical researches also provide 
evidence that institutions have a strong tendency to buy overvalued stocks (Edelen, Ince, and 
Kadlec 2016) and the increase in the number of sophisticated investors does not necessarily lead 
to greater market efficiency (Stein 2009). During the tech bubble period, Brunnermeier and Nagel 
(2004) and Griffin et al. (2011) show that hedge funds rode with the bubble and destabilized the 
market.  
 These contrary findings may be attributable to the ambiguous purpose of hedge fund holdings 
and trades (Cao, Chen, et al. 2018). In this research, we study hedge funds in China, where the 
hedge fund holdings of stocks are mainly for arbitrage purpose and with limited or no hedging 
effect.  
In China, two potential reasons make it more difficult to pick up undervalued stocks than that 
in developed markets. First, the Chinese stock market is highly speculative, stock prices have weak 
links to their fundamentals and the macro economy, and both the market and regulators are 
immature and imperfect, the well-known Chinese economist Wu Jinglian dubbed it “casino” in 
20013. There are major incidents that spectacular price rallies followed by severe market crashes 
occurring in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s, which are difficult to explain by market fundamentals. 
Reported by Bloomberg in April 2015, the average price earnings ratio of Chinese tech stocks is 
41% higher than that of their U.S. counterparts at a price peak in March 2000. Compared with a 
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much developed market of Hong Kong, the mainland Chinese stock market has significantly 
speculative bubbles (Pavlidis and Vasilopoulos 2020). 
Second, the Chinese stock market is dominated by noise traders whose trading create a risk of 
the price that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively betting against them (De Long et al. 
1990b). In the Shanghai Stock Exchange of China, retail investors held 25.18% of the market value, 
while investment funds held only 2.93% by 2016. Of those retail investors, 74.7% do not have a 
college education which means it’s hard for them to calculate fundamental value4. However, the 
U.S. institutional investors own 80% of the market value far more than retail investors own5.  
Therefore, prices may deviate from fundamental values for a long time in the Chinese stock 
market, which limits professional investors’ risk-bearing capacity (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Kang, Kondor, and Sadka (2014) document that hedge funds might reduce their positions after a 
series of adverse shocks, which leads to the increased idiosyncratic volatility of high-idiosyncratic-
volatility stocks and the decreased idiosyncratic volatility of low-idiosyncratic-volatility stocks. 
Jiang, Xu, and Yao (2009) show that the higher institutional ownership, the lower idiosyncratic 
volatility of stocks.  
 To summarize, rather than competing with retail investors to buy the sought-after 
undervalued stocks, overvalues stocks are more difficult to explore by retail investors because 
short selling is costly, it is not allowed or is very limited in China, hedge funds can explore 
overvalued stocks and use their skills to time the market and hold low idiosyncratic risk stocks to 
ride the trend, and quickly pull capital out of the market before a crash while retail investors 
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continue to buy and hold them. We have 
Hypothesis 1: Hedge funds prefer to hold overpriced stocks with low idiosyncratic risk. 
We expect to find that hedge fund holdings are positively related to the degree of stock 
mispricing, in particular for overpriced stocks, and negatively related to idiosyncratic volatility.  
   If hedge funds hold overpriced stocks and ride on the price trend of stocks, this is to drive 
stocks prices further away from their fundamental values. We have 
Hypothesis 2: Hedge fund holdings and trades impede the dissipation of mispricing. 
If the market is efficient, mispricing will be quickly corrected, stocks with abnormal 
performance will not maintain the performance subsequently. However, when market is inefficient 
and mispricing persistence, holding stocks with abnormal past performance might be profitable (Y. 
Chen, Da, and Huang 2019). In the case of Chinese hedge funds, we have 
Hypothesis 3: Hedge fund trades predict stock returns. 
We now turn to investigate the sources of hedge fund performance. The literature usually 
measures hedge fund performance under a factor model framework (Agarwal and Naik 2004; 
Capocci and Hübner 2004; Eling and Faust 2010; Hong, Huang, and Zhao 2019; Sancetta and 
Satchell 2005). Griffin and Xu (2009) document that hedge funds exhibit a strong preference for 
high-momentum stocks compared with other firm characteristics. Huang, Yao, and Zhu (2018) 
show that Chinese hedge funds outperformed the stock market despite regulatory disruptions, and 
the performance is significantly positively associated with the momentum factor. 
The Chinese stock market is generally regarded as having a speculative nature with a large 
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number of young and inexperienced retail investors. The demand shocks of retail investors are 
easy to correlate with the rise of strong and persistent mispricing over time (Baker and Wurgler 
2006; Han and Li 2017), which provides opportunities for hedge funds to profit from trend-chasing 
strategies. If hedge funds prefer to hold overpriced stocks, they will make profit by riding the trend, 
hedge funds returns should be positively associated with momentum factor. It would be 
intersecting to test 
Hypothesis 4: Hedge fund returns come from the momentum factor.  
Last but not least, we analyze whether hedge funds intentionally hold overvalued stocks. 
Previous studies suggest that market friction, particularly short-selling restrictions, forces 
sophisticated traders to hold overvalued stocks. With short-selling constraints, stock prices which 
mainly reflect investors’ heterogeneous expectations are higher than their real value (Miller 1977) , 
investors are willing to pay a higher price for the right to resell shares to other agents who have 
more optimistic beliefs rather than hold them forever (Harrison and Kreps 1978; Scheinkman and 
Xiong 2003). 
 There are studies suggest that fund managers have skills to accurately identify mispriced 
stocks and get superior fund performance (Dong and Doukas 2020; R. Huang, Asteriou, and 
Pouliot 2020; Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers 2019). Moreover, hedge funds ride a bubble 
deliberately (Brunnermeier and Nagel 2004; Griffin et al. 2011) and manipulate stock prices (Ben-
David et al. 2013) rather than simply failing to understand that stocks are overvalued. In summary, 
if hedge funds deliberately hold overpriced stocks, we would expect 
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Hypothesis 5: Hedge fund holdings of overvalued stocks decrease before a price peak, but 
they do not decrease after the short-selling ban is lifted. 
 
3. Data and Measures of Mispricing  
We compile a dataset of hedge fund equity holdings. Our sample includes 6,849 hedge fund 
management companies, which together manage more than 10,096 funds spanning January 2007 
through March 2016. This dataset covers all major hedge funds trading in Chinese equity markets. 
3.1. Hedge Fund Data 
We collect a master list of hedge funds and their management companies from the AMAC. 
The list contains all hedge fund management companies and all hedge funds that only invest in the 
secondary stock market.  
To obtain hedge fund holdings data, following Li, Brockman, and Zurbruegg (2015), we 
collect the top 10 shareholders’ quarterly holdings of Chinese A-share stocks from the RESSET 
database and match stock holdings to hedge funds 6 . To compare with other funds’ holding 
behaviors, we also collect other funds’ quarterly holdings of Chinese A-share stocks from the 
RESSET database. 
For funds included in our hedge fund list, we collect daily and monthly net asset value (NAV) 
data from the WIND database. Hedge fund returns are calculated based on funds’ NAV adjusted 
for dividend payout. We also collect data on funds’ issuance scale.                                                                 
3.2. Stock Market Data 
We collect Chinese A-share stock market data from the CSMAR databases. Our sample covers 
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all publicly listed stocks on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges except CSI 3007 stocks, 
and comprises 2,591 stocks as of March 2016. This is to ensure that our sample only includes 
stocks that are less likely to be used as hedging instruments. Our stock dataset includes but is not 
limited to the daily data of stock returns, risk-free return rate, trading status, quarterly data of 
market capitalization, market capitalization, book value, dividends, firm age, net income, and 
leverage ratio. We perform the same tests with the sample including CSI 300 stocks and find 
consistent results.8  
We manually merge the fund holding and quarterly stock characteristics data. In each quarter, 
stocks are selected if their trades are not suspended at the previous quarter. Our merged panel data 
contain 19,681 firm-quarter observations over the January 2007 through March 2016 period.  
Based on the comprehensive dataset, Panel A of Table 1 reports stock characteristics at the 
firm-quarter level for all stocks held by hedge funds (top 10 outstanding shareholders). Panel B 
and Panel C respectively report the corresponding results for the subsample of stocks within the 
top decile of hedge fund holdings and non-hedge fund holdings each quarter. The characteristics 
include book-to-market ratio, market capitalization, dividend yield, firm age, and price. 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
  
The average book-to-market ratio is 0.80 with a median of 0.58 for the full sample, which is 
slightly higher than the average (median) book-to-market ratio of 0.71 (0.40) for stocks with high 
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hedge fund holdings. Stocks with high hedge fund holdings have younger ages (176.83 months vs. 
179.64 months) and higher share prices (15.31 CNY vs. 14.38 CNY) than the full sample of stocks 
in the merged dataset. Conversely, stocks that belong to the top decile of non-hedge fund holdings 
have lower book-to-market ratio (0.53 vs 0.80), larger market capitalization (6.36 billion CNY vs 
billion 4.97 CNY) than the full sample of stocks. 
3.3. Measures of Mispricing  
We use three proxies to measure stock mispricing. Specifically, relative mispricing is the 
degree of deviation between the stock price and the security market line, absolute mispricing refers 
to the degree of deviation between the stock price and the fundamental value of the stock, and 
anomaly mispricing points to the degree of mispricing measured by cross-sectional return 
anomalies shown in the finance studies that cannot be fully explained by standard risk models.  
Brennan and Xia (2001) define mispricing as the difference between the realized average return 
on a security and the return predicted by an asset pricing model. Therefore, we construct factors in 
the Chinese stock market (Guo et al. 2017) and use the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor 
(FF3) and five-factor (FF5) models to measure relative mispricing. Using daily stock returns for 
each quarter, we estimate the FF3 model: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,                 (1) 
and the FF5 model:  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 
     𝛽5𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                       (2) 
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in which 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return on stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡, 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the free-risk return on day 𝑡, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is the 
value-weighted market excess return, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the return of the zero-net-investment portfolio for 
size,  𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is book-to-market equity, 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 is profitability, and 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is investment factors.  𝛼𝑖 is the measure of relative mispricing for stock 𝑖. The security market line is calculated by beta 
and factors in the right-hand sides and displays the expected returns of a stock. If a stock’s expected 
return versus its systematic risk (beta) is plotted above the security market line, it is considered 
undervalued. Conversely, if a stock’s expected return versus its systematic risk (beta) is plotted 
below the security market line, it is overvalued because the investor would accept a smaller return 
for the amount of systematic risk associated. The daily data are from CSMAR databases and 
calculated by weighting all A-share market shares by outstanding market value. 
We measure absolute mispricing as the difference between the market value of a stock and its 
fundamental value as estimated by Rhodes–Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). We run a 
cross-sectional regression to estimate absolute mispricing. 𝑙𝑛(𝑀)𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑡𝑙𝑛 (𝐵)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑗𝑡𝑙𝑛 (𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡+ + 𝛽3𝑗𝑡𝐼(<0)𝑙𝑛 (𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡+ + 𝛽4𝑗𝑡𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (3)                                              
in which ln(M)𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the quarterly market value of stock 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡 and sector 𝑗, 𝑙𝑛 (𝐵)𝑖𝑡 is 
book value, ln (𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡+  is the absolute value of net income, 𝐼(<0)ln (𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡+  is an indicator function 
for negative net income, and 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the leverage ratio. This cross-sectional regression contains 
time-varying market expectations for the industry average growth and discount rates; a firm-
specific error can be interpreted as a firm-specific deviation from the contemporaneous industry-




 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0̂ + 𝛽1𝑗𝑡̂ 𝑙𝑛 (𝐵)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑗𝑡̂ 𝑙𝑛 (𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡+ + 𝛽3𝑗𝑡̂ 𝐼(<0)𝑙𝑛 (𝑁𝐼)𝑖𝑡+ + 𝛽4𝑗𝑡̂ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡  (4)     𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑀)𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡                                   (5) 
For each sector, we use fitted values as the proxy of 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡, and use the difference 
between market value and fitted value to measure absolute mispricing. Specifically, we classify 
industries into seven groups according to the Chinese A-share stock classifications: mining, 
manufacturing, energy, wholesale, transportation and warehousing and postal services, real estate, 
and other industries. 
Finally, we follow Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) and measure the degree of mispricing 
based on 10 cross-sectional return anomalies except for the net operating assets anomaly 
(Hirshleifer et al. 2004) because of lacking of corresponding accounting data in China. The 10 
return anomalies include financial distress (Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi 2008), O-Score 
bankruptcy probability (Ohlson 1980), Net stock issues (Ritter 1991), Composite equity issues 
(Daniel and Titman 2006), Total accruals (Sloan 1996), Momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993), 
Gross profitability (Novy-Marx 2013), Asset growth (Cooper, Gulen, and Schill 2008), Return on 
assets (Fama and French 2006) and Investment-to-assets (Titman, Wei, and Xie 2004).  
Based on the above 10 return anomalies, we first score all stocks in our sample each quarter 
according to their future returns predicted by each of these anomalies. This score ranges from 0 to 
100 and increases as overpricing increases. Specially, the high value of momentum, gross 
profitability premium or return on assets is followed by high future return which means low degree 
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of overpricing and is assigned to low score. The high value of O-Score or the five remaining 
anomalies is followed by low future return which means high degree of overpricing and is assigned 
to high score. A stock’s aggregate score is the equal-weight average of the ranking percentile 
previously quarterly computed. 
4. Empirical Results  
4.1. Hedge Fund Holdings and Mispricing 
In this section, we test Hypothesis 1. First, we test whether hedge funds hold overvalued stocks 
and the relationship between hedge fund holdings and the magnitude of relative mispricing, 
absolute mispricing or anomaly mispricing. Furthermore, we test the relationship between hedge 
fund holdings and value arbitrage costs proxied by idiosyncratic volatility. 
4.1.1 Relative Mispricing 
To test Hypothesis 1, we first investigate whether hedge funds tend to hold overvalued stocks 
that have significant negative alpha. We run the Fama-MacBeth regression: 𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝐷(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑡𝐷(𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (6) 
in which 𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 is hedge fund holdings (or non-hedge fund holdings) as the fraction of shares held 
by all hedge funds (or non-hedge funds) in stock 𝑖  by the end of quarter 𝑡 . 𝐷(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy variable equaling one if the stock 𝑖 had a significant 
positive alpha in quarter 𝑡 − 1 and equals zero otherwise, 𝐷(𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy 
variable equaling one if the stock 𝑖 had a significant negative alpha in quarter 𝑡 − 1 and equals 
zero otherwise. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1is a vector of control variables of stock characteristics including one-quarter 
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lagged values of book-to-market ratio, market capitalization, dividend yield, firm age, and share 
price. Following the literature, the dependent and independent variables (except dummy variables) 
are standardized at each quarter so that the regression coefficients can be compared across years 
(e.g., Gompers and Metrick 2001). Because stock holdings are measured as a percentage, we take 
the natural log for all stock characteristics (except dummy variables) so that the variables have 
similar interpretations. For dividend yield, the logarithmic transformation is  𝐿𝑛(1 + 𝐷/𝑃) 
because not all stocks pay dividends each quarter.  
 Hypothesis 1 expects that hedge fund holdings increase with significant overvalued stocks and  𝛽2𝑡 is significantly positive. 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
    Table 2 reports the results of the relationship between fund holdings and two one-quarter 
lagged dummy variables, one for significant overpricing and another for significant underpricing. 
For hedge fund holdings, the average coefficient on 𝐷(𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑖,𝑡−1 is positive and 
significant in column (1) and column (3), but the average coefficient on 𝐷(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑖,𝑡−1 
is insignificant. This suggests that stocks with a significantly negative alpha in the previous quarter 
are associated with significantly higher hedge fund holdings in the present quarter, which supports 
Hypothesis 1. However, there is no significant relation between non-hedge fund holdings and the 
lagged dummy variables of significant alpha estimated by FF5 in column (4).  
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In terms of the relationship between stock characteristics and equity holdings by hedge funds, 
we find that hedge funds tend to hold smaller stocks compared with non-hedge funds, i.e., the 
coefficient on market capitalization is –0.058 (𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = −3.44) for hedge fund holdings 
in column (3) but 0.191  (𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 8.02) for non-hedge fund holdings in column (4). 
Further, hedge funds prefer to hold growth stocks (𝛽 = −0.032, 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = −2.39) and 
stocks with higher lagged prices (𝛽 = 0.077, 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 3.81).  
Next, we exploit the relationship between hedge fund holdings and the degree of mispriced 
stocks with significant alpha: 𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡|𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1| + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                           (7) 
in which |𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1| is the absolute value of significant intercept of FF3 or FF5 measuring the 
deviation from the security market line for stock i at the end of quarter 𝑡 − 1, which is estimated 
by using each stock’s daily returns in quarter 𝑡 − 1. Thus, Hypothesis 1 expects that hedge fund 
holdings increase with the increase of |𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1| when stocks are overpriced; specifically, 𝑏𝑡 
is significantly positive when 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 is significant and negative in the previous quarter.  
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
  
Table 3 shows the results of the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of hedge fund and 
non-hedge fund holdings on a one-quarter lagged significant alpha. For hedge fund holdings, the 
average coefficient on the absolute value of lagged significantly negative alpha is positive and 
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significant (𝑖. 𝑒.  𝛽 = 0.346 , 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 3.43 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐴; 𝛽 = 0.477 , 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =3.09 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝐵), which indicates that stocks with overvalued alpha in the previous quarter are 
associated with significantly higher hedge fund holdings in the present quarter, which supports 
Hypothesis 1 again. Our results are in line with Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), indicating that 
rational investors invest in overpriced securities and support Hypothesis 1.    
4.1.2 Absolute Mispricing 
To further test Hypothesis 1, we use the valuation model proposed by Rhodes–Kropf, 
Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) to estimate the degree of mispricing based on stock 
fundamental value. We test whether hedge fund stock holdings are once again cross-sectionally 
related to the magnitude of mispricing. We run the Fama-MacBeth regression: 
 𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                      (8) 
in which 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 is the measure of deviation from the fundamental value of stock i at 
the end of quarter 𝑡 − 1. Because 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 increases with the degree of overpricing, 𝑏𝑡 
should be positive in support of Hypothesis 1. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here]  
 
Table 3 shows the results from regressions of fund holdings and one-quarter lagged mispricing. 
For hedge fund holdings, the average coefficient on lagged firm mispricing (𝛽 = 0.072, 𝑡 −𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 3.52) is positive and significant in column (1), suggesting that the more stocks are 
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overvalued in the previous quarter, the higher the hedge fund holdings in the present quarter. 
However, there is no significant relationship between non-hedge fund holdings and firm 
mispricing (𝛽 = −0.002, 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = −0.18) in column (2). Therefore, we find that hedge 
funds do not trade against mispricing but hold overvalued stocks, which is in line with the finding 
that hedge funds hold overvalued stocks as documented in Griffin et al. (2011) and again supports 
Hypothesis 1.  
4.1.3 Anomaly mispricing 
We finally employ the Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) mispricing measure to further test 
Hypothesis 1. Based on the above 10 return anomalies, we compute the equal-weight average of 
the ranking percentile for each stock, each quarter. We examine whether hedge fund holdings are 
once again positively related to the degree of mispricing. We run the Fama-MacBeth regression: 
 𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                      (9) 
in which 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1  is the overpricing score for stock i  at the end of quarter  𝑡 − 1 . 
Because 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 increases with the degree of overpricing, 𝑏𝑡 should be positive in 
support of Hypothesis 1. 
 
[Insert Table 5 Here]  
 
Table 5 shows the results from the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of fund holdings 
on one-quarter lagged overvalued score9. In column (1), the more the stocks are overvalued in the 
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previous quarter, the higher the hedge fund holdings in the present quarter (𝛽 = 0.041, 𝑡 −𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 3.61). Meanwhile, there is a significant and negative relationship between non-hedge 
fund holdings and mispricing score (𝛽 = −0.057, 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = −2.89) in column (2). Thus, 
we find that hedge fund holdings increase with the degree of overvaluation, which is in line with 
the finding that institutions have a strong tendency to buy overvalued stocks (Edelen, Ince, and 
Kadlec 2016) and again supports Hypothesis 1. 
Regarding the relationship between stock characteristics observed in the previous quarter and 
hedge fund and non-hedge fund equity holdings in the current quarter, the evidence is similar to 
that presented in Table 3.  
 
4.1.4 Idiosyncratic Volatility 
We find that hedge funds do not trade against mispricing. Intuitively, hedge funds then should 
not bear the cost of arbitrage. We now examine the relationship between hedge fund holdings and 
value arbitrage costs measured by idiosyncratic volatility. 
Run the following Fama-MacBeth regression:                              𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                     (10) 
in which 𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 is the hedge fund shareholding ratio (or non-hedge fund shareholding ratio) of 
stock 𝑖 by the end of quarter 𝑡, 𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is idiosyncratic volatility for stock 𝑖 and measured by 
the standard deviation of daily return residuals from the FF3 or FF5 over quarter 𝑡 − 1, and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 




[Insert Table 6 Here]  
 
Table 6 presents the results. The estimation results in column (1) and (3) show that the average 
coefficient on the lagged idiosyncratic volatility is negative and significant (𝑖. 𝑒. 𝛽 = −0.034, 𝑡 −𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = −3.26). A one-standard-deviation increase in idiosyncratic volatility leads to a 0.045 
(0.034) decrease in hedge fund holdings in the next quarter, while there is a 0.043 (0.037) decrease 
in non-hedge fund holdings in the next quarter. The estimated coefficients on the other stock 
characteristics are similar to those in Table 3. Moreover, alpha is the intercept from FF3 or FF5 
estimated using each stock’s daily returns in last quarter. 
In sum, hedge fund holdings are significantly negatively related to lagged idiosyncratic 
volatility, consistent with Hypothesis 1. This finding suggests that hedge funds are less willing to 
bear value arbitrage costs when they hold stocks, which is consistent with the notion that 
sophisticated investors may avoid holding stocks with high arbitrage risk (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997). Meanwhile, the result is inconsistent with the evidence presented by Cao, Chen, et al. (2018), 
because the Chinese stock market is dominated by noise traders whose beliefs create a risk in the 
price of the asset (De Long et al. 1990b) and prices may deviate from fundamental values for a 
long time, which discourages rational hedge funds to bear the cost associated with arbitrage.  
4.2. Hedge Fund Holdings and the Dissipation of Alpha 
We now focus on how hedge fund holdings and trades are related to the degree of mispricing 
25 
 
and test the Hypothesis 2. Following Cao, Chen, et al. (2018), we use the following logit 
regressions to see whether hedge fund holdings and trades are associated with the dissipation of 
negative alpha and positive alpha, respectively.  
 𝐷(𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∆𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
    𝐷(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∆𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (11) 
in which 𝐷(𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑡  ( 𝐷(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑡 ) is a   
dummy variable equaling 1 if the stock had a significantly negative (positive) alpha in quarter 𝑡 −1 that is no longer significant in quarter t and equals 0 otherwise. alpha𝑡 is the intercept from the 
FF3 or FF5 and is estimated using each stock’s daily returns in quarter 𝑡 − 1. ∆𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 is fund 
trades, and 𝜑𝑡 is a quarter fixed effect to control for changes in alpha over time. 
 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
  
Table 7 reports results of the logit regression with standard errors clustered across stocks. The 
results in Panel A indicate that hedge fund trades in a quarter are significantly negatively related 
to the likelihood that negative alpha dissipates in the next quarter (𝛽 =– 0.067， 𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = – 2.02) . Non-hedge fund holdings in a quarter are also significantly negatively related to the 
likelihood that negative alpha dissipates in the next quarter (𝛽 = – 0.115, 𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = – 2.58).   
Panel B of Table 7 shows that both hedge fund holdings and trades in a quarter are significantly 
negatively related to the likelihood that a positive alpha dissipates in the next quarter. In particular, 
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the coefficient on hedge fund holdings is −0.163 (𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = −2.31)  and the coefficient 
associated with hedge fund trades is −0.121(𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = −1.72) in column (2), suggesting that 
their holdings and trades actually impede stock price reversion to the security market line in the 
next quarter. However, non-hedge fund holdings and trades in a quarter are not significantly related 
to the likelihood that positive alpha dissipates in the next quarter.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, hedge fund holdings and trades exacerbate mispricing, and the 
effect is more obvious on underpriced stocks. This finding is consistent with Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2004), who find that rational arbitrageurs do not exert a correcting force on stock prices. 
Meanwhile, non-hedge fund holdings also exacerbate mispricing, and the effect is more obvious 
on overpriced stocks, which support Akbas et al. (2015) who find that aggregate flows to mutual 
funds appear to exacerbate cross-sectional mispricing. 
4.3. Hedge Fund Performance 
4.3.1 Does Hedge Fund Trade Predict Stock Returns?  
In this section, we discuss if hedge funds trade exploit market inefficiency by examining if 
hedge fund trades predict future stock returns, the Hypothesis 3. We estimate the return 
predictability of hedge fund trades by comparing the investment returns of two portfolios. The 
stocks are sorted into two equally weighted portfolios based on hedge fund trades (changes in 
holdings) over quarter t; we use stocks with top 30% changes in holdings to build a high portfolio 
and use stocks with bottom 30% changes in holdings to build a low portfolio. Next, both portfolios 
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are held for three months (quarter t+1) before rebalancing. Following Liu and Strong (2008), we 
obtain a monthly return time-series for each portfolio over the sample period and adjust according 
to market return, specifically, minus CSI 300 monthly return.  
 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
  
Table 8 reports the portfolios’ performance based on hedge fund trades. Those having larger 
hedge fund holdings outperform their counterparts with smaller hedge fund holdings. For example, 
the high hedge-fund-holding portfolio has an average return to 1.78% per month, significantly 
higher than the 1.38% monthly return for the low hedge-fund-holding portfolio. The return spread 
between the portfolios is 0.4% per month (𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 1.99) and approximately 4.8% per year, 
which is both economically and statistically significant. Adjusted by FF3 (FF5) factors, the average 
return for high hedge-fund-holding portfolio still higher than for low hedge-fund-holding portfolio 
(0.36% vs -0.10% adjusted by FF3 and 0.09% vs -0.27% adjusted by FF5). Additionally, the high 
hedge-fund-holding portfolio exhibits higher Sharpe and information ratios (i.e., average excess 
return of the portfolio over its idiosyncratic volatility), suggesting that stocks more intensively 
held by hedge funds have more attractive risk-return trade-offs.  
Therefore, the results are in line with Hypothesis 3, that hedge fund trades predict stock returns. 
Specifically, stocks with heavy hedge fund trades tend to have large abnormal returns subsequently. 
This finding is also consistent with the negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and 
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subsequent stock returns (Hou and Loh 2016), and in testing Hypothesis 1 we find that hedge fund 
holdings are significantly negatively related to lagged idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, our 
finding implies that hedge funds buy overvalued stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility, not only 
for lower loss risk but also for higher future returns. 
4.3.2 Measurement of Hedge Fund Performance  
 We have shown that hedge funds prefer to hold overvalued stocks and impede the dissipation 
of mispricing. Now we turn to identify the sources of hedge funds returns, the Hypothesis 4.  
We measure the monthly performance of equally weighted (EW) and scale-weighted (SW) 
hedge fund portfolios using FF3 and FF5 with and without the momentum factor (MOM): 
    𝑅𝐻𝐹,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                  𝑅𝐻𝐹,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                     (12) 
in which 𝑅𝐻𝐹,𝑡 is the return of EW and SW hedge fund portfolios in month 𝑡. The momentum 
factor (𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡) accounts for trend-chasing strategies in stock markets, i.e., buying stocks that were 
past winners and selling past losers (Carhart 1997). Other related variables are defined the same 
as in those in models (1) and (2). 
 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
  
Table 9 reports the regression results. We find that both the EW and SW portfolios are 
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significantly positive on the MOM and market factors. For example, the SW portfolio loads 0.074 
(t-statistic = 2.07) on MOM and 0.038 (t-statistic = 12.82) on the market factor in column (8). The 
EW fund portfolio loads 0.089 (t-statistic = 2.46) on MOM and 0.279 (t-statistic = 11.61) on the 
market factor in column (4). In addition, the FF5 + MOM model generally performed well in 
explaining fund returns, with 𝑅2 values of 0.655 in the EW portfolio and 0.675 in the SW 
portfolio. The results support Hypothesis 4 and show that both the EW and SW portfolios load 
significantly positive on MOM, suggesting that hedge funds tend to chase past winners. These 
results are similar to those of Griffin and Xu (2009), who show that hedge funds exhibit a strong 
preference for high-momentum stocks compared to other firm characteristics. 
In the aggregate, our results show that hedge fund returns mainly come from the market and 
MOM factors and that trend-chasing behavior may be why funds prefer to hold overvalued stocks. 
4.4. Do Hedge Funds Deliberately Hold Overpriced Stocks? 
Having found that hedge funds are more likely to hold overpriced stocks at the stock and fund 
levels, we now turn to the question about whether hedge funds do so deliberately or whether they 
simply fail to eliminate a bubble caused by frictions such as short-selling restrictions. This is to 
test the Hypothesis 5. 
4.4.1 Hedge Fund Holdings Around Stock Price Peaks 
As a first approach to test Hypothesis 5, we look at hedge fund holdings around the price peaks 
of individual stocks. We choose the longest and most complete bull market in our sample time 
period, July 2014 to June 2015; at the time, the Shanghai Stock Index rose from 2,054 to 2,178. 
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Following Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), we construct a quarterly return index from 2013 to 
2015 for each stock. We define the price peak as the quarter-end at which the stock reached its 
maximum value. To ensure that we can observe holdings several quarters before a peak, we focus 
on stocks that peaked in 2014 or 2015. For each stock, we calculate the proportion of outstanding 
shares held by hedge funds. Using event study method, we align these quarterly series of hedge 
fund holdings with the event time. Event-time quarter 0 is the quarter of the price peak. We then 
take a value-weighted average across stocks and divide them into three samples based on the 
degree of mispricing. 
Figure 2 reports the results. For highly overvalued stocks, i.e., stocks with a bottom 30% alpha 
estimated by the Fama-French five-factor (Panel A) or three-factor (Panel B) models or stocks 
with top 30% mispricing calculated by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005; Panel C), hedge funds owned a 
greater proportion of outstanding equity before than after the (quarterly) price peak.  
 
 [Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
In Panel A of Figure 2, hedge funds held a larger share, 3.6%, one quarter before a price peak, 
which decreased to 3.25% at the end of the peak-quarter and further declined in later quarters. 
Consistent with Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), hedge funds seem to be more successful in timing 
their investments within overvalued stocks than within undervalued and other stocks. These stock-
by-stock results suggest that hedge funds are successful in exiting before price collapses, which 
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supports Hypothesis 5. Hedge fund managers stop increasing their share of overvalued stocks 
when stock prices near their peak, which intentionally causes other investors to suffer most of the 
losses from a price collapse.  
 
4.4.2 Hedge Fund Holdings Around the Short-selling Ban Lifts 
To further test Hypothesis 5, we examine whether hedge fund behaviors are caused by market 
friction. We use a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis that compares the difference in hedge 
fund holdings before and after a short-selling ban lift with those of a control group around the same 
ban lift to over- and undervalued stocks. 
From 2010 onward, restrictions on short selling have been progressively lifted in the Chinese 
stock market. Specifically, 90 stocks could be sold short on February 12, 2010, and another 190 
stocks were added to the list on November 25, 2011. The five main ban lifts occurred on February 
12, 2010; November 25, 2011; January 25, 2013; September 6, 2013; and September 12, 2014. 
Until March 2016, 982 Chinese A-share stocks could be shorted after the five ban lifts. In our study, 
each of the short-selling ban lifts can be considered as a treatment, and the differences in changes 
in hedge fund holdings between stocks that can and cannot be shorted are the outcomes. The 
experimental groups are stocks that can be shorted. By comparing the changes in hedge fund 
holdings before and after each ban lift, the effect of market friction, i.e., short-selling policy, is 
tested. We estimate the following DID model: 𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾′𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (13) 
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in which 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable for which 1 represents stock 𝑖 added to the shorting list 
and 0 represents stock 𝑖 not added to the list. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable of time for which 1 
indicates that stocks can be shorted during this period and 0 indicates that stocks cannot be shorted. Short𝑖,𝑡 ∗ Time𝑖,𝑡 is an interaction term whose coefficient (i.e., 𝛽3 ) measures the net effect of 
short-selling policy on hedge fund holdings. We estimate 𝛽3 for each ban lift.  
We further divide the sample into positive and negative alpha stocks to further investigate 
whether hedge funds are forced to hold overvalued stocks because of short-selling restrictions. If 
hedge funds are thus forced to hold overvalued stocks, hedge fund holdings should decrease in the 
negative alpha (overvalued stocks) subsample after short-selling restrictions relax and 𝛽3 should 
be significantly negative. Meanwhile, in the positive alpha (undervalued stocks) subsample, hedge 
fund shareholding should increase after short-selling restrictions ease and 𝛽3  should be 
significantly positive. 
To select stocks for the control group, after separating the samples according to negative or 
positive alpha, we calculate the mean (μ) and standard deviation (δ) of the variables in the 
experimental group one year before the short-selling ban lift. Specifically, the variables include 
hedge fund holdings, alpha value, and five control variables (lagged stock characteristics including 
book-to-market ratio, market capitalization, dividend yield, firm age, and share price). Next, we 
select the stocks from Chinese A-share listed stocks in the range (μ-3δ  μ+3δ) of these variables 
one year before the short-selling ban lift. If a stock has a value for either of these variables outside 
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 Table 10 reports the results of the DID analysis with alpha estimated by FF3 or FF5. In the 
negative alpha subsample, the coefficient on Short𝑖,𝑡 ∗ Time𝑖,𝑡 is not significant and there is no 
significant change in hedge fund holdings before or after a short-selling ban lift for the alpha 
estimated by FF3 (𝛽 = 0.326, 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 0.76)  or FF5 (𝛽 = 0.169, 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =0.41). This result implies that hedge funds are not forced to hold overpriced stocks. Further, in the 
positive alpha subsample, the coefficient on Short𝑖,𝑡 ∗ Time𝑖,𝑡  is significant and positive in 
column (2) (𝛽 = −2.562, 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = −4.562)  and column (4) (𝛽 = −2.188, 𝑡 −𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = −3.69), which means that hedge funds decrease their holdings of undervalued stocks 
after short-selling restrictions are lifted. 
Taken together, our results support Hypothesis 5 and suggest that hedge funds hold overpriced 
stocks on purpose but not because of market friction, which is consistent with the results of Abreu 
and Brunnermeier (2003).  
5. Robustness 
5.1 Hedge Fund Position and Degree of Mispricing 
In above sections, hedge fund holdings are computed based on the top 10 shareholder's 
quarterly holdings, which may result in biased results. For example, hedge funds may separate risk 
and diversify their investments by having small holdings among various undervalued stocks. Now, 
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we use an optimization method to investigate whether hedge funds mainly hold low-alpha stocks 
at the fund level, especially stocks that are not included in the top 10 outstanding shareholders data. 
To estimate the hedge fund shareholding ratio of different alpha portfolios, we follow Chen 
and Chi (2018) and build a composite return based on different alpha portfolios and minimize the 
squared difference between the hedge fund return series and the composite return series. 
Furthermore, we obtain the global optimized weights of different alpha portfolios in the composite 
return, which are the estimated fund holdings in different alpha portfolios. Using this model, we 
can estimate the fund holdings of different daily alpha portfolios and obtain economically 
meaningful estimations. The specific form of the model is as follows: Min ‖𝑅𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑝,𝑡‖22 = 1𝑇 ∑ (𝑅𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑝,𝑡)2𝑇𝑡=1  ,                  𝑅𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛽ℎ ∗ 𝑅𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚 ∗ 𝑅𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿 ∗ 𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓 ∗ 𝑅𝑓 , s. t.  𝛽ℎ + 𝛽𝑚 + 𝛽𝐿 + 𝛽𝑓 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽ℎ, 𝛽𝑚, 𝛽𝐿 , 𝛽𝑓 ≥ 0                             (14) 
in which 𝑅𝑗,𝑡 is the net return of each hedge fund 𝑗 in day 𝑡, 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 is the composite return in day 𝑡 .  𝑅𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ,𝑡 , 𝑅𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚,𝑡 , and 𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑤,𝑡  are the returns on different alpha portfolios. The global 
optimized parameters: 𝛽ℎ,  𝛽𝑚, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽𝐿 are hedge funds’ estimated holdings in different alpha 
portfolios. 𝛽𝑓 is hedge fund’s estimated holdings of riskless assets. The model assumes that hedge 
funds cannot short stocks.  
Specifically, we use the following method to calculate returns on different alpha portfolios. 
First, we construct annual formed alpha portfolios based on the FF3 (FF5) alpha of the stocks at 
the end of the previous year. Stocks with an alpha in the top 30th percentile of all alphas for 
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publicly listed Chinese A-share stocks are classified as high, while stocks with an alpha in the 
bottom 30th percentile are classified as low. Stocks with an alpha between the 30th to 70th 
percentiles are classified as medium. We then calculate issuance size weighted daily returns for 
each portfolio (RHigh, RMedium, RLow) using annual alpha. 
 
 [Insert Table 11 Here] 
 
Table 11 reports the fund position estimation for different alpha portfolios. For hedge fund 
holdings, the average position is 0.153 (0.114) on high-alpha portfolios and 0.191 (0.205) on low-
alpha portfolios in Panel A (Panel B). When testing for the difference in the average position 
between high and low alpha portfolios, the p-value strongly rejects the null that the average 
positions are the same for high and low alpha portfolios (i.e., High-Low = –0.038, t-statistic = 6.46 
in Panel A; High-Low = 0.091, t-statistic = –16.43 in Panel B). These results suggest that hedge 
funds prefer to hold overvalued stocks at the fund level, which is consistent with the results of 
Section 4.1 and supports Hypothesis 1 at the fund level. 
 
5.2 Excluding the Financial Crisis Period 
Our sample period is relatively short and starts before the financial crisis of 2007-2008, we 
exclude the financial crisis period and again run the regression on the hedge fund holdings and 




 [Insert Table 12 Here] 
  
Table 12 shows the results of the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions (eq. (7)) of hedge 
fund holding on a one-quarter lagged significant alpha excluding the financial crisis period. For 
positive alpha, hedge fund holdings are insignificantly related to the magnitude of positive alpha. 
For negative alpha, hedge fund holdings are significantly and positively related to the absolute 
value of negative alpha (𝑖. 𝑒. 𝛽 = 0.412 , 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 3.15) . This suggests again that hedge 
fund holdings increase with the degree of overpriced stocks after excluding the financial crisis 
period, which is consistent with our main findings.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We use a comprehensive dataset of Chinese hedge fund holdings covering all major hedge 
fund management companies from 2007 to 2016 to examine the role of hedge funds in the stock 
price formation process. Our empirical analysis shows that based on different valuation models, in 
the cross-section of stocks, hedge funds holdings of stocks are positively related to the degree of 
stock overpricing, and this is not the case for non-hedge funds holdings. In addition, hedge fund 
holdings are significantly negatively related to idiosyncratic volatility. We further find that stocks 
with high hedge fund holdings generate an abnormal return to 1.78% per month, resulting in a 
return spread of approximately 4.8% per year compared with low hedge fund holdings. 
Further, hedge fund holdings and trades impede the dissipation of stock mispricing, and hedge 
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fund performance is mainly driven by trend chasing. This seems to suggest that the trend-chasing 
behavior of hedge funds in China may be why hedge funds prefer to hold overvalued stocks. 
Finally, we examine hedge fund holdings around stock price peaks and the short-selling ban lifts. 
Hedge funds reduce their holdings before price collapses, but there are no significant changes 
before or after the short-selling ban lifts. This suggests that hedge funds intentionally hold 
overvalued stocks.  
Distinct from the findings that hedge funds bring prices closer to fundamental values (Cao, 
Liang, et al. 2018; Y. Chen, Da, and Huang 2019), hedge funds play a different role in the asset 
pricing formation process in China. First, stock price may deviate from fundamental values for a 
long time, because the Chinese stock market is dominated by noise traders and lacks of a strong 
link to fundamentals. Second, different regulatory framework as we compared in Appendix A, 
shorter locked period, limited leverage ratio and derivatives hamper the Chinese hedge funds to 
implement long-term investment strategies that long undervalued stocks. Third, fund managers 
have the skills to time the market and to identify mispriced stocks to make money (Dong and 
Doukas 2020). Our results directly challenge the view that sophisticated investors consistently 
move against mispricing, and it enriches the research on the role of sophisticated investors in asset 
pricing and shed new lights on the information content and potential investment value of hedge 







1. The underlying index, the CSI 300 Index, is the stock index that China Securities Index Co., Ltd. 
composed with the 300 largest A-Shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (179 stocks) and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (121 stocks). 
2. In Appendix A, we give a full account of privately offered funds in China (Chinese hedge funds), which 
includes privately offered funds’ characteristics, such as establishment conditions, qualified investors, 
operation modes, investment restrictions, etc. The following website also provides an overview of Chinese 
hedge funds’ the regulatory framework: https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-015-
9140?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true We also summarize the 
difference between privately offered funds and general hedge funds.  
3. The speech reported by CCTV in 2001: http://www.cctv.com/financial/ fengyun/sanji/20010114.html. 
4. Data from Shanghai stock exchange statistics annual in 2017. 
5. Data from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/ 
statement-roisman-2019-11-05-14a-2b 
6. We note that our data set of hedge fund holdings based on the top 10 shareholder's quarterly holdings has 
its limitations. These partial holdings may result in biased results. For example, hedge funds may separate 
risk and diversify their investments by having small holdings among various undervalued stocks. We use 
an optimization method to investigate hedge fund holdings at the whole fund level in Section 5.1, especially 
stocks that are not included in the top 10 outstanding shareholders data. 
7. The CSI 300 Index consists of the 300 largest and most liquid A-share stocks, and CSI 300 Index futures 
were introduced in 2010. 
8. The results are available upon request. 
9 . We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the use of the Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) 
mispricing measure. 
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Panel A: The Development of All Hedge Funds  
 
Panel B: The Development of Hedge Funds and Mutual Funds in the Stock Market 
 
Figure 1. The Development of Hedge Funds in China 
Note: Figure 1 shows the development of hedge funds and mutual funds. Panel A reports the 
development of all hedge funds during 2006 to March 2016, and the data are from the WIND 
database. Specifically, “all hedge funds” include those invested in the stock market, unlisted 
companies, VC, bonds and so on. Panel B shows the development of hedge funds and mutual funds 







Table 1. Summary Statistics of Stock Characteristics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75% Min Max Skewness Kurtosis' 
Panel A: All stocks in the full sample 
Book/Market 0.80  0.72  0.36  0.58  0.96  0.13  3.75  2.22  8.35  
Market cap 
(¥ bil) 4.97  4.63  2.32  3.59  5.86  1.14  42.23  3.49  20.85  
Dividend 
yield (%) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  2.99  11.27  
Age(month) 179.64  60.86  135.00  176.00  223.00  63.00  316.00  0.21  2.46  
Price (¥) 14.38  9.92  7.53  11.46  17.60  3.57  48.05  1.65  5.59  
Panel B: Stocks Belong to the top decile of hedge fund holdings 
Book/Market 0.71  0.66  0.32  0.54  0.83  0.13  3.75  2.75  11.77  
Market cap 
(¥ bil) 4.96  4.43  2.21  3.61  6.06  1.14  42.23  3.09  17.43  
Dividend 
yield (%) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  2.96  11.11  
Age (month) 176.83  62.45  134.00  171.00  219.00  63.00  316.00  0.23  2.51  
Price (¥) 15.31  9.44  8.58  13.06  18.78  3.57  48.05  1.53  5.39  
Panel C: Stocks Belong to the top decile of non-hedge fund holdings 
Book/Market 0.53 0.49 0.26 0.40 0.62 0.13 3.75 3.41 18.59 
Market cap 
(¥ bil) 6.36 4.86 3.28 4.91 7.81 1.14 42.23 2.47 11.89 
Dividend 
yield (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 3.58 16.28 
Age (month) 172.22 60.50 128.00 167.00 210.00 63.00 316.00 0.39 2.71 
Price (¥) 20.69 10.96 12.72 17.64 26.44 3.57 48.05 1.03 3.32 
Note: Table 1 provides the summary statistics for all stocks owned by hedge funds (Panel A), and 
for stocks that belong to the top decile of hedge fund holdings (Panel B), and for stocks that belong 
to the top decile of non-hedge fund holdings (Panel C) in each quarter. The reported statistics 
include book-to-market ratio, market capitalization (in ¥ billion), dividend yield per quarter (in %), 
firm age (in months), and share price (in ¥). The full sample is based on a merged AMAC hedge 
fund list, top 10 outstanding shareholders’ holdings in Chinese A-share stock data, and stock 






Table 2. Regression of Hedge Fund (Non-Hedge Fund) Holdings on Lagged Dummy  
Significant Alpha 
 （1） （2） （3） （4） 
 HF_SHt Non_HF_SHt HF_SHt Non_HF_SHt 
D(PostiveAlpha)_FF3t-1 -0.032 0.056   
 (-0.43) (0.63)   
D(NegativeAlpha)_FF3t-1 0.505*** -0.058**   
 (4.84) (-2.40)   
D(PostiveAlpha)_FF5t-1   -0.080 0.060 
   (-1.09) (0.68) 
D(NegativeAlpha)_FF5t-1   0.425*** -0.039 
   (4.52) (-1.61) 
Ln(Book/Market)t-1 -0.030** -0.021** -0.032** -0.022** 
 (-2.29) (-2.10) (-2.39) (-2.14) 
Ln(Market Cap)t-1 -0.059*** 0.190*** -0.058*** 0.191*** 
 (-3.56) (8.10) (-3.44) (8.02) 
Ln(Dividend yield)t-1 0.005 -0.013 0.005 -0.012 
 (0.62) (-1.20) (0.58) (-1.13) 
Ln(Age)t-1 0.008 0.023** 0.008 0.022** 
 (0.55) (2.22) (0.57) (2.14) 
Ln(Price)t-1 0.075*** 0.268*** 0.077*** 0.268*** 
 (3.89) (22.92) (3.81) (23.07) 
constant -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.037*** -0.040*** 
 (-4.80) (-2.79) (-4.51) (-2.75) 
avg. R-squared 0.062 0.169 0.058 0.168 
N 17834 17834 17834 17834 
Note: Table 2 shows the results from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of hedge fund 
holdings and non-hedge fund holdings on one-quarter lagged dummy significant alpha. 𝐷(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑖,𝑡−1  is a dummy variable equaling one if the stock 𝑖  had a significant 
positive alpha in quarter 𝑡 − 1 and equals zero otherwise, 𝐷(𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎)𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy 
variable equaling one if the stock 𝑖 had a significant negative alpha in quarter 𝑡 − 1 and equals 
zero otherwise. The control variables are lagged stock characteristics including book-to-market 
ratio, market capitalization, dividend yield, firm age, and share price. All of the variables (except 
dummy variables) are standardized each quarter based on the full sample. The sample period is 











Table 3. Regression of Hedge Fund (Non-Hedge Fund) Holdings on Lagged Significant Alpha 
 （1） （2） （3） （4） 
 HF_SHt Non_HF_SHt HF_SHt Non_HF_SHt 
 Positive Alpha Positive Alpha Negative Alpha Negative Alpha 
Panel A：Alpha Estimated by FF3 
alpha_FF3t-1 -0.074 -0.069 0.346*** -0.011 
 (-1.34) (-1.26) (3.43) (-0.41) 
constant 0.016 0.447 4.231*** -0.277** 
 (0.09) (0.59) (5.55) (-2.13) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
avg. R-squared 0.592 0.627 0.564 0.459 
N 563 563 1021 1021 
Panel B：Alpha Estimated by FF5 
alpha_FF5t-1 -0.037 -0.063 0.477*** 0.042 
 (-0.89) (-1.08) (3.09) (0.98) 
constant -0.042 0.145 2.987*** -0.131* 
 (-0.45) (0.67) (4.54) (-1.85) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
avg. R-squared 0.578 0.592 0.513 0.437 
N 537 537 1130 1130 
Note: Table 3 shows the results from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of hedge fund 
(non-hedge) fund holdings on one-quarter lagged significant alpha. In quarter t, alphat-1 is the 
absolute value of significant intercept from the FF3 (FF5) and is estimated using each stock’s daily 
returns in quarter t-1. The control variables are lagged stock characteristics including book-to-
market ratio, market capitalization, dividend yield, firm age, and share price. All of the variables 
(except dummy variables) are standardized each quarter based on the full sample. The sample 




Table 4. Regression of Hedge Fund (Non-Hedge Fund) Holdings on Lagged Mispricing 
 (1) (2) 
 HF_SH t Non_HF_SH t 
Firm-Mispring t-1 0.072*** -0.002 
 (3.52) (-0.18) 
Ln(Book/Market)t-1 0.022 -0.025* 
 (1.54) (-2.03) 
Ln(Market Cap)t-1 -0.103*** 0.195*** 
 (-5.20) (7.59) 
Ln(Dividend yield)t-1 0.008 -0.013 
 (1.24) (-1.14) 
Ln(Age)t-1 0.001 0.025** 
 (0.07) (2.32) 
Ln(Price)t-1 0.080*** 0.268*** 
 (3.90) (21.70) 
constant -0.017** -0.042*** 
 (-2.25) (-2.89) 
avg. R-squared 0.040 0.163 
N 17834 17834 
Note: Table 4 reports the results from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of hedge fund 
and non-hedge fund holdings on one quarter lagged mispricing. The control variables are lagged 
stock characteristics including book-to-market ratio, market capitalization, dividend yield, firm 
age, and share price. In quarter t, Firm-Mispricingt-1 is the regression error from the Rhodes-
Kropf et al. (2005) model and is estimated by quarterly, firm-level, cross-sectional regressions 
in quarter t-1. All of the variables (except dummy variables) are standardized each quarter based 
on the full sample. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016. ***, **, and * denote statistical 











Table 5. Regression of Hedge Fund (Non-Hedge Fund) Holdings on Lagged Anomaly 
mispricing 
 (1) (2) 
 HF_SH t Non_HF_SH t 
Misp_Score t-1 0.041*** -0.057** 
 (3.61) (-2.89) 
Ln(Book/Market)t-1 -0.056** 0.001  
(-2.88) (0.07) 
Ln(Market Cap)t-1 -0.041*** 0.141***  
(-4.37) (4.64) 
Ln(Dividend yield)t-1 0.012 -0.042*  
(0.88) (-1.87) 
Ln(Age)t-1 -0.007 0.045**  
(-0.30) (2.37) 
Ln(Price)t-1 0.052** 0.289***  
(2.28) (23.96) 
constant 0.000 -0.000  
(1.20) (-0.75) 
avg. R-squared 0.032 0.154 
N 8743 8743 
Note: Table 5 reports the results from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of hedge fund 
and non-hedge fund holdings on one quarter lagged anomaly mispricing. The control variables 
are lagged stock characteristics including book-to-market ratio, market capitalization, dividend 
yield, firm age, and share price. Following Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015), Misp_Scoret-1 is 
the equal-weigth average of the ranking percentile for each stock based on the 10 return 
anomalies except for the net operating assets anomaly in quarter t-1. All of the variables (except 
dummy variables) are standardized each quarter based on the full sample. The sample period is 










Table 6. Regression of Hedge Fund (Non-Hedge Fund) Holdings on Lagged Idiosyncratic Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 HF_SH t Non_HF_SH t HF_SH t Non_HF_SH t 
Idio_vol_FF3 -0.045*** -0.043***   
 (-4.45) (-4.80)   
Idio_vol_FF5   -0.034*** -0.037*** 
   (-3.26) (-3.98) 
Ln(Book/Market)t-1 -0.033** -0.027** -0.034** -0.027*** 
 (-2.46) (-2.63) (-2.59) (-2.73) 
Ln(Market Cap)t-1 -0.059*** 0.198*** -0.059*** 0.198*** 
 (-3.50) (8.46) (-3.50) (8.43) 
Ln(Dividend yield)t-1 0.003 -0.015 0.002 -0.016 
 (0.43) (-1.41) (0.28) (-1.48) 
Ln(Age)t-1 0.003 0.023** 0.003 0.023** 
 (0.23) (2.19) (0.21) (2.18) 
Ln(Price)t-1 0.082*** 0.277*** 0.084*** 0.279*** 
 (4.00) (23.01) (4.04) (23.47) 
constant -0.016** -0.040*** -0.015** -0.040*** 
 (-2.24) (-2.74) (-2.15) (-2.73) 
avg. R-squared 0.039 0.166 0.039 0.166 
N 17834 17834 17834 17834 
Note: Table 6 presents the results from the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of hedge 
fund and non-hedge fund holdings on one-quarter lagged idiosyncratic risk. The control variables 
are lagged stock characteristics, including book-to-market ratio, market capitalization, dividend 
yield, firm age, and share price. In quarter t, IdioVolt-1 is the standard deviation of return residuals 
from the FF3 or FF5 and estimated using each stock’s daily returns in quarter t-1. All of the 
variables (except dummy variables) are standardized each quarter based on the full sample. The 
sample period is from 2007 to 2016. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 






















Table 7. Logit Regression of Alpha Dissipation on Institutional Holdings 
 (1) (2) 
 Alpha_FF3 Alpha_FF5 
 Coef. z-Score Coef. z-Score 
Panel A: Dependent variable = D (Negative Alpha dissipation) t 
HF_SHt-1 0.009  0.26  -0.003  -0.07  
Non-HF_SHt-1 -0.146  -2.98  -0.115  -2.58  
ΔHF_ SHt-1 -0.059  -1.70  -0.067  -2.02  
ΔNon_HF_SHt-1 -0.042  -0.85  -0.026  -0.59  
Control variables Yes  Yes  
Quarter dummies Yes  Yes  
Stock-quarter obs. 15473   15429   
Pseudo R-squared 0.017   0.017   
Panel B: Dependent variable = D (Positive Alpha dissipation) t 
HF_SHt-1 -0.107 -1.49 -0.163 -2.31 
Non-HF_SHt-1 0.000 0.01 -0.006 -0.10 
ΔHF_ SHt-1 -0.092 -1.58 -0.121 -1.72 
ΔNon_HF_SHt-1 0.027 0.55 0.024 0.48 
Control variables Yes  Yes  
Quarter dummies Yes  Yes  
Stock-quarter obs. 15341  15270  
Pseudo R-squared 0.069  0.058  
Note: Table 7 presents the results from logit regressions of alpha dissipation on the level and 
change in stock holdings by hedge and non-hedge funds. For each stock in each quarter t, 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the stock was a positive-alpha (negative-
alpha) share in quarter t-1 but not in quarter t and 0 other wise. The control variables are lagged 
stock characteristics, including book-to-market ratio, market capitalization, dividend yield, firm 
age, and share price. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 8. Summary Statistics of Portfolio Returns (decimals per month) 
 
Portfolios based on 
Δ HF_SH 
 Low_portfolio High_portfolio 
Mean return 0.0138 0.0178 
Median return 0.0134 0.0167 
Standard Dev. 0.0717 0.0724 
Adjusted return 
(FF3) -0.0010 0.0036 
Adjusted return 
(FF5) -0.0027 0.0009 
Sharpe ratio 
（Rf benchmark） 0.1487 0.2037 
Information ratio 
（CSI 300 benchmark） 0.1486 0.2034 
Information ratio 
（Rf benchmark） 0.0138 0.0178 
Note: Table 8 reports the “out of sample” performance of two equally weighted portfolios: the first 
investing in stocks with a top 30% changes in hedge fund holdings, and the second investing in 
stocks with a bottom 30% changes in hedge fund holdings. In each quarter t, we sort stocks into 
two equally weighted portfolios based on their change in hedge fund holdings (△  HF_SH) in 
quarter t. The portfolios are held for three months before rebalancing. The monthly return is 
decomposed by quarterly return (Liu and Strong, 2008) and adjusted by market return, i.e., minus 













Table 9. Regression of Hedge Fund Monthly Return and Factors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 EW EW EW EW SW SW SW SW 
Rm-Rf_FF3 0.271*** 0.285***   0.306*** 0.318***   
 (12.37) (12.79)   (13.91) (14.07)   
SMB_FF3 0.118*** 0.102***   0.138*** 0.125***   
 (3.12) (2.70)   (3.65) (3.28)   
HML_FF3 -0.081 -0.069   0.000 0.010   
 (-1.29) (-1.12)   (0.00) (0.17)   
MOM  0.084**  0.089**  0.070*  0.074** 
  (2.33)  (2.46)  (1.91)  (2.07) 
Rm-Rf_FF5   0.265*** 0.279***   0.296*** 0.308*** 
   (11.08) (11.61)   (12.49) (12.82) 
SMB_FF5   0.044 0.022   0.055 0.037 
   (0.57) (0.29)   (0.72) (0.48) 
HML_FF5   -0.151** -0.141*   -0.075 -0.067 
   (-2.03) (-1.94)   (-1.02) (-0.93) 
RMW_FF5   -0.070 -0.074   -0.089 -0.092 
   (-0.55) (-0.59)   (-0.71) (-0.74) 
CMA_FF5   0.123 0.128   0.166 0.171 
   (1.02) (1.09)   (1.39) (1.45) 
alpha -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (-4.32) (-4.07) (-4.04) (-3.77) (-5.69) (-5.47) (-5.45) (-5.21) 
adj. R-
squared 0.640 0.655 0.638 0.655 0.685 0.693 0.691 0.701 
F 64.544 51.820 38.716 34.877 78.690 61.430 48.915 42.780 
N 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
Note: Table 9 reports the intercepts of alpha, the slopes of the factors, and t-statistics (in 
parentheses) for the FF3, FF3 + MOM, FF5, and FF5 + MOM estimated on the monthly portfolios 
of hedge funds. The data cover 24,290 funds from January 2007 to March 2016. ***, **, and * 







Panel A. Hedge fund holdings around price peaks of individual stocks: grouped stocks by 




Panel B. Hedge fund holdings around price peaks of individual stocks: grouped stocks by 











Panel C. Hedge fund holdings around price peaks of individual stocks: grouped stocks by 





Figure 2 Hedge Fund Holdings Around Price Peaks of Individual Stocks 
Note: For each stock, we construct a quarterly total return index from 2013 to 2015 and determine 
each stock’s price peak during that period. Each quarter, we also calculate the proportion of 
outstanding shares held by hedge funds. For stocks with peaks in 2014 or 2015, we align the time-
series of holdings with the event time (value-weighted), in which the price peak is the event-time 
quarter 0. We then average hedge fund holdings in event time across all stocks in the sample. The 
figure presents these event-time averages for three samples of stocks, based on the degree of 
mispricing. In Panel A of Figure 2, we divide stocks into three groups based on the alpha estimated 
using the Fama-French three-factor model. In Panel B of Figure 2, we divide stocks into three 
groups based on the alpha estimated using the Fama-French five-factor model. In Panel C of Figure 
2, we divide stocks into three groups based on mispricing calculated using Rhodes-Kropf et al. 
(2005).      
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Table 10. DID Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 alpha_FF3<0 alpha_FF3>0 alpha_FF5<0 alpha_FF5>0 
 HF_SH HF_SH HF_SH HF_SH Short𝑖,𝑡 ∗ Time𝑖,𝑡 0.326 -2.562*** 0.169 -2.188*** 
 (0.76) (-4.65) (0.41) (-3.69) Short𝑖,𝑡 -0.126 0.808*** 0.188 0.540** 
 (-0.56) (3.44) (0.87) (2.50) Time𝑖,𝑡 0.927*** 3.247*** 0.984*** 2.943*** 
 (3.54) (6.84) (3.95) (5.92) 
Ln(Book/Market)t-1 -0.728*** -0.100 -0.695*** -0.147 
 (-4.33) (-0.47) (-4.14) (-0.68) 
Ln(Market Cap)t-1 0.326* -0.110 0.186 0.050 
 (1.86) (-0.62) (1.08) (0.31) 
Ln(Dividend yield)t-1 5.730 -3.190 -9.484 -1.280 
 (0.27) (-0.12) (-0.46) (-0.05) 
Ln(Age)t-1 0.079 0.407 0.043 0.436 
 (0.21) (1.14) (0.12) (1.18) 
Ln(Price)t-1 0.472** 0.456* 0.402* 0.530** 
 (2.13) (1.87) (1.86) (2.11) 
constant -6.779** 0.749 -3.552 -2.996 
 (-1.98) (0.20) (-1.08) (-0.84) 
adj. R-squared 0.027 0.022 0.022 0.021 
N 3070 2752 3273 2548 
Note: Table 10 reports the results from DID regression of hedge fund holdings around the short-
selling ban lifts. Short𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable, in which 1 represents stocks that are added to 
the shorting list, and 0 represents stocks that are not added. Time𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable, for 
which 1 indicates that stocks can be shorted during the period, and 0 indicates that stocks cannot 
be shorted. Short𝑖,𝑡 ∗ Time𝑖,𝑡 is an interaction term whose coefficient measures the net effect 
of short-selling policy on hedge fund holdings. All of the variables (except dummy variables) 
are standardized each quarter based on the full sample. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016. 










Table 11. Estimated Hedge Fund Positions in Small and Large Alpha Portfolios 
Panel A: Alpha Calculated by FF3 
 N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis 25% Median 75% 
R High 4965 0.000  1.000  0.153  0.249  2.010  6.372  0.001  0.020  0.212  
R Median  4965 0.000  1.000  0.089  0.202  2.866  10.937  0.000  0.003  0.043  
R Low  4965 0.000  1.000  0.191  0.284  1.610  4.556  0.001  0.028  0.301  
Rf 4965 0.000  1.000  0.568  0.355  -0.321  1.681  0.265  0.626  0.917  
           
Panel B: Alpha Calculated by FF5 
 N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis 25% Median 75% 
R High 4965  0.000  1.000  0.114  0.214   2.487  9.000  0.001  0.009  0.122  
R Median  4965  0.000  1.000  0.106  0.213  2.469  8.641  0.000  0.004  0.080  
R Low  4965  0.000  1.000  0.205  0.290  1.496  4.148  0.001  0.042  0.313  
Rf 4965 0.000  1.000  0.576  0.353  -0.354  1.704  0.278  0.640  0.922  
Note: Table 11 shows the results of return-based fund-position estimation in various alpha 
portfolios. First, we construct daily formed alpha portfolios based on the alpha of the stocks at the 
end of last year. Stocks with an alpha in the top 30th percentile of all alphas for publicly listed 
Chinese A stocks are classified as high, while stocks with an alpha in the bottom 30th percentile 
are classified as low. Stocks with an alpha between the 30th to 70th percentiles are classified as 
medium. We then use annual alpha data to calculate issuance scale -weighted daily returns for 
each portfolio: RHigh, RMedium, and RLow. We get rid of funds with zero returns and have 4,965 
funds from 2007 to 2016. In Panel A, the alpha is estimated using the FF3. In Panel B, the alpha 
















Table 12. Regression of Hedge Fund Holdings on Lagged Significant Alpha Excluding the 
Financial Crisis Period 
 （1） （2） （3） （4） 
 HF_SHt HF_SHt HF_SHt HF_SHt 
 Positive Alpha Negative Alpha Positive Alpha Negative Alpha 
alpha _FF3t-1 -0.097 0.378**   
 (-1.32) (3.27)   
alpha_FF5t-1   -0.052 0.412** 
   (-0.89) (3.15) 
Ln(Book/Market)t-1 0.043 0.247 -0.004 0.030 
 (0.49) (0.69) (-0.09) (0.20) 
Ln(Market Cap)t-1 0.196 0.787 0.169 0.435 
 (1.27) (1.18) (1.15) (0.70) 
Ln(Dividend yield)t-1 -0.004 0.181 0.046 0.152 
 (-0.07) (2.03) (1.02) (1.86) 
Ln(Age)t-1 -0.123 -0.559 0.009 -0.715 
 (-1.46) (-1.63) (0.27) (-1.94) 
Ln(Price)t-1 0.262 0.482 0.065 -0.211 
 (1.66) (0.69) (1.26) (-0.61) 
constant -0.075 4.616*** 0.002 3.440*** 
 (-0.50) (6.18) (0.02) (4.88) 
avg. R-squared 0.549 0.522 0.534 0.472 
N 552 993 530 1102 
Note: Table 12 shows the results from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of hedge fund 
holdings on one-quarter lagged significant alpha excluding the financial crisis period. In quarter t, 
alphat-1 is the absolute value of significant intercept from the FF3 (FF5) and is estimated using 
each stock’s daily returns in quarter t-1. The control variables are lagged stock characteristics 
including book-to-market ratio, market capitalization, dividend yield, firm age, and share price. 
All of the variables (except dummy variables) are standardized each quarter based on the full 
sample. The sample period is from 2007 to 2016. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A. Privately Offered Funds in China 
In this appendix, we introduce privately offered funds’ characteristics, establishment 
conditions, qualified investors, operation modes and investment restrictions in China. On this basis, 
we summarize the differences between private equity funds and general hedge funds. 
China’s privately offered funds are offered through nonpublic sources for specific investors 
(institutional or retail investors) and are mainly invested in the secondary market. China’s first 
privately offered funds were born in the late 1990s. 
Privately offered funds have the following characteristics. First, the threshold for purchase is 
high, and they are only privately issued to qualified institutions and individuals; not the public, nor 
are they publicly promoted. Generally, each investment is not less than one million yuan (about 
145,380 USD). Second, privately offered fund managers generally charge 20% excess 
performance compensation every time the net value of the fund reaches a high return. Third, the 
fund pursues absolute positive returns. Because fixed management fees are small and the fund 
depends on excess performance fees, the interests of private equity fund managers and investors 
are relatively consistent. Therefore, privately offered funds need to pursue absolute positive returns 
and strictly control downside risks. Fourth, the proportion of stock investment is flexible, from 0% 
to 100%, which enables partial or complete avoidance of the systemic risk of the market. Fifth, the 
funds have flexible operations. Compared with mutual funds, the size of privately offered funds, 
usually tens of millions to hundreds of millions, is small, and the requirements for industry 
concentration and equity concentration are lower. Sixth, they have limited liquidity. Privately 
offered funds generally have a 6 to 12-month closure or share lock-in period. Seventh, there is less 
information disclosure. Funds usually publish their net value weekly, biweekly, or monthly. In 
addition, funds up to 50 million yuan in size must disclose their information monthly and all 
products each quarter. 
Establishment of a privately offered fund requires adoption of a filing system. After 
fundraising is complete, the fund manager files a record with the fund industry association. Private 
fund managers are required to have registered capital of no less than 100 million yuan and must 
have paid-in monetary capital. 
Investors in privately offered funds are restricted to qualified investors, that is, a unit or 
individual with the corresponding risk identification ability and risk bearing ability to invest in a 
single privately offered fund with an amount of not less than 1 million yuan and meets the 
following relevant standards: (1) a unit whose net assets are not less than 10 million yuan; (2) an 
individual whose financial assets are not less than 3 million yuan or whose annual average income 
in the recent three years is not less than 500,000 yuan. The total number of investors in a fund 
cannot exceed 200. 
There are three operation modes of privately offered funds. The most popular mode is 
entrusted management, such as sunshine privately offered funds. These funds let investors hand 
over their money to a trust company that signs a management agreement with a privately offered 
fund manager. The manager buys a certain proportion of the funds, such as 20%, to achieve mutual 
benefits and avoid a transfer of benefits caused by inconsistent benefits. This kind of privately 
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offered fund relies on the trust laws, which are clearly defined, and a standard trust plan. According 
to the 2017 China’s Privately Offered Funds Industry Development Report published by AMAC, 
the number and assets of privately offered funds with entrusted management mode were 99.6% 
and 98.3%, respectively, by 2016. 
The second operation mode is self-management. These funds manage themselves by building 
internal management teams. In general, several people contribute to set up a company as a limited 
partnership, in which one or more parties give money and other parties gives expertise. The 
distribution proportion is stipulated in the articles of the contract and may not be in accordance 
with the proportion of investment. By 2016, the number and assets of privately offered funds with 
self-management were just 0.4% and 1.7%, respectively. 
The third operation mode is the consultant mode. These privately offered fund managers 
provide investment advisory services for asset management products managed by other financial 
institutions (i.e., trust companies, securities companies, futures companies, etc.). As investment 
advisers or research consultants, fund managers must meet the requirements of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, the AMAC, and corresponding regulatory authorities for 
investment advisers. In addition, asset management products (i.e., trust plans, securities capital 
management plans, futures capital management plans, etc.) can be sold directly by financial 
institutions or entrusted to other eligible financial institutions for sale. 
The securities that privately offered funds are allowed to invest in include publicly issued 
stocks, bonds, fund shares, and other securities and derivatives specified by the security regulatory 
authority under the State Council. The main investments are stocks and bonds on exchanges and 
interbank markets. However, hedge funds can usually invest in a wider range of asset classes, 
including but not limited to stocks, bonds, derivatives, currencies, real estate, etc. 
In terms of investment strategies, Chinese privately offered funds suffer from greater 
restrictions than hedge funds. Chinese privately offered funds are not allowed to short selling, and 
their leverage multiples and underlying asset types are also strictly restricted. In the regulations on 
the operation and management of privately offered funds, the leverage ratio must not be more than 
1 times the funds that are invested in stocks. Moreover, total assets in structured funds cannot 
exceed 140% of net assets, and total assets in unstructured collective funds cannot exceed 200% 
of net assets. We present a clearer comparison of privately offered funds and hedge funds in Table 
A.1. 
In summary, privately offered funds share many of the same characteristics as hedge funds in 
the U.S. and other developed markets (Eling and Faust, 2010). They have a similar fee structure. 
Privately offered funds issue products known as Private Asset Management Plans and sell them to 
a limited number of investors who satisfy income and minimum investment thresholds. The lock-
in period for this investment is usually long-term compared with that of mutual funds. There are 
no specific restrictions on the strategies used by the issued products. The management team of a 




Table A.1. Comparison of Privately Offered Funds and Hedge Funds 
 Privately Offered Funds Hedge Funds 
Country China U.S. 
Register 
Issuers must register and put 
their funds on record within 20 
working days after fundraising 
completion. 
Issuers must register if their AUM 
exceed $1 million and investors 
exceed 500. Hedge fund issuance 
does not require registration. 
Fundraising Type Nonpublic Nonpublic 
Qualified Investors 
1) Personal net assets exceed 
¥ 3,000,000. 
2) Personal annual income 
exceeded ¥500,000 in the 
last 3 years. 
3) Institutional investors’ total 
assets exceed ¥10,000,000 
1) Personal net assets exceed 
$1,000,000. 
2) Personal annual income is 
stable and has exceeded 
$200,000 in the last 2 years. 
3) Institutional investors’ total 
assets exceed $5,000,000. 
Maximum Number of 
Investors 200 500 
Minimum Investment 
Amount ¥1,000,000 $250,000~$1,000,000 
Lock-in Period 3~12 months 12~24 months 
Fees 
1) Subscription fees are 1-3% 
of investment amount. 
2) Redemption fees are 3-5% of 
the redemption amount. 
3) Management fees are 2% of 
investment amount per year. 
4) Performance fees are 20% of 
funds’ NAV increment. 
1) Management fees are 2% of 
investment amount per year. 
2) Performance fees are 20% of 
funds’ NAV increment. 
Investment Strategies 
Use of short selling, derivatives, 
leverage ratio are relatively 
limited. 
Funds can execute any investment 
strategy and adapt them 
accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
